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Abstract
Time is essentially a part of our lives that we take for granted, not thought about or even really noticed
until we suddenly suppose that we do not have any, or anyway not enough. Yet the manner in which we
choose to spend our time, and more so whether or not we make the needed effort to reflect on it, determines
the kind of life that we lead and the type of person that we are － in short, time structures the self, and the
self in its world is thereby either ‘made’ or ‘making’. The following thus examines these areas of time, of our
relating to time, from the default position of embeddedness and the engaged position of the experiential: or
in other words with an eye on the clock or a hand on the pulse. After primarily considering Husserl’s,
Heidegger’s, and Bergson’s thoughts on time we then propose our own, filling out the overall picture with
perspectives from contemporary scientific accounts and some philosophic responses before suggesting
ways in which an altered notion of time could importantly lead to a more purposeful view of self and of
being.
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要 旨
「時間」― それは、基本的には、我々の生活において当然なものであり、ない、あるいは足りないと感
じるまでは、それについて考察したり、深く気づいたりしない。ただし、時間をどのように過ごすかとい
う選択、さらに、それについて思考するために必要な努力をするかしないかという選択は、我々がどのよ
うな生活を送りどのような人になるかを大きく左右する。短く言えば、時間は自我を構造化し、自らの世
界内の自我はそれによって「作られている」か「作りつつある」かである。本稿では、時間のそれらの領
域、つまり我々が時間とどのように関わっているかについて、embeddedness（社会や環境や歴史や経済状
況や教育制度等のなかに埋め込まれている）という既定の立場と、経験されるものという積極的関与の立
場から、検討する。言い換えれば、時計を見つめながら、また同時に、手首で脈をとりながら、検討する
のである。フッサール、ハイデッガー、およびベルグソンの時間に対する思考について基本的な考察を行
い、自らの考えを提案する。今日の科学的説明の視点、またそれに対する哲学のいくつかの反応を用いて
全体像を補ったうえ、新たな時間概念が自我と存在のヨリ合目的的な見方につながる可能性について提言
する。
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1【論文】
1. Linear Illusions
We find ourselves alive in this world, we find ourselves aware － at times quite painfully － of the life
situations we did not ask for and yet have. Towards what purpose? On whose account? Why? Where?
When? When: that is the issue, and although the answer can really only be ‘now’ we nevertheless mentally
mire ourselves in the what-was and the to-come, spending our days in guilty regret or wistful longing. As
the creatures we are we apparently cannot help it, and reflecting on this common aspect to human
existence just seems to generate either more looking backwards or more looking forwards. It is an oddly
jarring thing to be a human being, at once in and oh-so-out-of one’s environment. Yet here we are, and this is
how we know our ‘are’.
In the below I would like to ask that we pause for a few moments to think on this situatedness of the
self, on its feeling-of and feeling-out-of time, and I would like to argue that although we are naturally affected
by what we take to be time as a movement expressed in a linear fashion, in fact time in the common
definitional sense of an objective and astronomical purity is ultimately a thing unknowable for us, and
furthermore that after analysis it likely is not even an ‘is’ at all. Although we may consider time to be a
straight arrow due to our perceptually observed and personally experienced physical change and decay,
mentally － experientially － time rarely flows in such an unambiguous way. When we study time too we
find that our default picture of it might be quite simple, too simple, simply wrong, a conclusion which
appears highlighted by scientific theories like Albert Einstein’s views on relativity, though in that case
there may also be widespread misunderstandings involved that cloud our thinking and color our
conclusions. On the other hand, we may also be reading far more than is warranted into such, pushing our
known encounters and concepts onto an essentially blank universe. Where then are we in time? With time?
It is my endeavor to try and maintain the position that all we can concretely ascertain of time is the
manner in which we feel it; and that despite our many mental castings that perception is only ever in the
now since both the past and the future are abstractions occurring within minds in the present. We order
our lives by linear notions (what to do tomorrow and the day after tomorrow), but on analysis such
categorizing is discovered to be merely conceptual, nothing but ideational posits that may or may not have
any basis in the reality that unfolds with each fresh instant. Clocks, calendars, and their associated bric-a-
brac are of course very useful － indispensible － but they are not the core nature of time, and when in our
finite human awareness we make them into representatives of universal laws we limit what we are and
might become. Still, if there can really only ‘be’ a now even this very ‘now’ is not itself cut and dry, and it is
certainly not experientially equal nor equally divided. I therefore want to additionally offer that a great
many ‘nows’ in the course of our lives end up feeling like ‘agains’ as we go through them, and this is a point
from which we can draw further conclusions about the individual, about the self, and about the place each of
us holds in this world we have woken up in. If time, as I shall suggest, is indeed ungraspable or nonexistent
then a deeper consequence is that we live as though already dead, that we are just as untetheredly dead as
we are alive, for if there is only ‘now’ it follows that there can be no ‘then’ nor ‘hereafter’. This result or this
adopted perspective is － perhaps paradoxically － extremely liberating.
To make this case I will cover three aspects related to the personal experience of time, centrally
considering three primary philosophical researchers who worked from a subject-oriented and analytical
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framework, namely Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Henri Bergson. Having covered these
thinkers we will in the latter portions of our study enlarge the picture with some of the purer scientific (i.e.
physical sciences) notions that have been put forward on time and its structure, and from there our own
stance will be further extended. The three phenomenological aspects to be entertained are: 1) that of the
unexamined or default position, which I will argue leads to a ‘made’ conception of self, 2) that of the
purposive and aware position, which I will argue leads to a ‘making’ conception of self, and 3) that of a
phenomenologically centered theoretical and transcendental position, which is not directly based on the
aforementioned writers, and which I will argue leads to a view of time that is not linear but spiraling within
the confines of a human life, and moreover that this ‘shape’ is due to the important element of the meanings
we assign, a factor that can significantly contribute to a ‘making’ conception of self.
2. Wristwatches
In this section we will present as background and foundation to our later comments what the
abovementioned trio of experientially-based philosophers wrote concerning time and its relation with the
self, and as might be expected much of their work is concerned with the daily, passively lived experience of
time, which is to say with the ‘there’s never enough time’ or ‘just passing the time’ or ‘time flies’ type of
attitudes. Husserl, to begin with, points out that whenever we take note of the passage of time there is
necessarily an instance of memory involved, that ‘it is consciousness of what has just been and not merely
consciousness of the now-point’.1 Moreover, the now-point is not anything in itself, rather simply an ‘ideal
limit’ that continually interacts with the not-now, and hence the now is ever shifting from perception into
memory.2 This means too that personal experiences of time are always subjective (and absolutely so), based
on the now and what we consciously (i.e. with or summonable into awareness) retain. Husserl writes that
we therefore cannot even approach objective time (which, he also claims, does not change), bound as we are
to our observational flows with their constant back-referencing.3 Living in and thinking about the world in
this way － as we instinctively do, and in many ways are required to do given everyday concerns － lends
great weight to the pragmatic and to our ongoing must-be-dealt-withs, so much so that Husserl states that
this perception and relation gives rise to what we might call a ‘face value’ notion of self, that:
what suffices as practical counts as the Self. Thus the house itself and in its true being, and specifically with respect
to its pure bodily thingly nature, is quickly given optimally, i.e. experienced as complete for that person who
regards it as a buyer or a seller. For the physicist and the chemist, such ways of experience would seem completely
superficial and miles away from its true being.4
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1 Edmund Husserl, The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental Phenomenology, intro. and ed. by Donn Welton
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 191; emphasis in the original; taken from Husserl’s On the Phenomenology
of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Section 12.
2 ibid., p. 196; from On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Section 16. Here Husserl is referring to his
notion of ‘primary memory’, which he distinguishes from ‘retention’ in that the first is directly connected with a percept while
the second records and follows a flow.
3 ibid., p. 209; again from On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Section 35-36.
4 ibid., p. 233. This is taken from Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, Section 4.
Here is our first hint at what I am labeling the ‘made’ self, the default, unintentional, and non-willed self that
results merely from being alive as the type of creature that we are. By the terms above, this is the
consideration of one’s self (i.e. as a whole person) oriented in the same way that one views the house as a
seller or a buyer. From this outlook one might still have acknowledged or unacknowledged self-concerned
desires, and one might make efforts to achieve them, but one will not thereby be actively working on one’s
self in its core nuance of essence or ‘who one really is’ fully considered in its various aspects; rather the
entirety will be externally focused and more than likely in the direction of attainment (‘getting that’). Note
the close connection Husserl is drawing here between time as a sensed flow joined to memory and the
notion of a ‘practical self’, a comprehension which, we might say, takes the surface of the self for the whole.
(As Husserl puts it, the physicist and chemist know better; as we might put it, an intentionally aware and
self-reflective person would know better － but that sort of discussion can wait for our second aspect
regarding time.)
In broad measure Heidegger follows his former teacher in his placement of experiential time from the
‘standard’ (unreflective) perspective, although he greatly expands its place and its scope. As with Husserl’s
focus on memory, Heidegger takes the having-been as the grounding for moods, even for future oriented
moods like hope, for in hope (and other similar frames), he writes, an individual still operates from a having-
been and towards that which is hoped for. Heidegger however calls attention to the circumstance that this
is only the case for ‘attuned’ creatures who exist in an always having-been (like us), and that some
nonhuman animals may more probably exist purely in a ‘now’. He adds that how time is constituted for such
organisms is a separate problem,5 but his raising of the issue is helpful in that it brings our focus onto the
role that one’s own consciousness structures play in the manner in which we experience time, and therefore
too in what we theoretically make of it.
On that issue of what we make of it, although attempting to settle the thorny question of what time
might ‘be’ in a universal absolutist sense is beyond the scope of the present (and has thus far escaped any
work’ s grasp), that does not mean an examination of the factors involved would prove fruitless, and
therefore what time could ‘be’ (or ‘mean’) for us will be briefly examined below, especially in the discussion
on our third listed aspect; for the moment I offer initially that perhaps there ‘is’ only the now of the
nonhuman animal, although for us human animals, given our mental engineering, the now is always felt as a
was-and-is, and our thoughts are (almost) always on the what-will-be. This is naturally a fairly trivial
observation, but it is nevertheless important to bear in mind in a study that regards the self, particularly if
we wish to arrive at some conclusions about the self’s made and making functions.
Returning to Heidegger while staying on the present (now), he writes that for Dasein (roughly, a human
self)6 the present ‘arises from’ the future and the having-been, that it involves ‘being entangled in lostness’
4 高知県立大学紀要 文化学部編 第 68 巻
5 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by Joan Stambaugh, rev. and for. by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2010).
6 Dasein is the German term that Heidegger uses to refer to a self, or to the self, or even to a full individual; it literally means
‘there’ and ‘being’ and is often also translated as ‘existence’. His employment of the word is unique and somewhat technical,
and as a result the label has more or less entered the relevant philosophical literature and discussions as is in its original
language.
and ‘swept along’ in our thrown/default (enworlded7) condition, and that the now moment can attain no
horizon of its own without an act of resolution on the part of Dasein that acknowledges the conditions of
both the situation and of its own ‘being-toward-death’.8 The future, past, and present are in fact forever so
deeply connected for Dasein, Heidegger insists, that ‘The future is not later than the having-been, and the
having-been is not earlier than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future that makes present,
in the process of having-been.’9 This detail of our experience, though, is a relatively closed one when we
operate in the typical ways that we do, for we tend to overlook the ‘place’ (within the embedded
contextualization) of that which we encounter, and because too of the manner in which our interpretations
are based on acquired concepts so that our outlooks and understanding are limited, Heidegger informs us,
in ‘the relevant possibility of truth and certainty, the kind of grounding and proof, the mode of being binding
and the kind of communication － all these will be determined.’10 In summarizing the situation he puts his
case thusly, ‘Insofar as Dasein temporalizes itself, a world is, too… The world is neither objectively present
nor at hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality… If no Dasein exists, no world is “there” either.’11 The
use of quotation marks/inverted double commas here is crucial: this is an ontological statement of meaning
for the situated self and not an empirical assertion. Heidegger’s ‘world’ is not the Earth as such, it is the
completeness of that in which an individual (Dasein) dwells, the entirety of their embeddedness and their
approach to and discernment of said entirety. With these thoughts we arrive at the last portion we will
examine of Heidegger’s analysis of experiential time as taken from the commonplace existential position
(the ‘made’ self): its publicness.
Due to the way in which we live, our ‘just passing through life’ as Heidegger (rightly, I think) puts it, we
do not consider our time to be a pure string of nows － we do not notice it as such, or perhaps more
accurately do not bother to take note of it as such － and so experientially time becomes ‘covered over’
(presumably Heidegger means here buried by activities, by busyness, by the suchnesses of ‘I want a bite to
eat’ and ‘Oh no my train is coming’, et cetera), and the result is that time for us is filled with ‘gaps’. In its
‘world’-ed (enworlded) condition, Dasein does not ‘take’ time for itself but instead ‘heedfully exploits the time
that “there is”, the time with which the they reckons.’12 It is the fact of thrownness, of being
unreflectively/non-noticingly in a world, that accounts for this feature of time as public, as shared and
therefore reckoned together. Time is social, Heidegger asserts, or at least socially bound, and if so we may
begin to wonder if there can be such a thing as an objective time. Husserl, as mentioned above, stated that
there is objective time, that it does not change, and that in our limitedness we cannot get near to it.
Heidegger, as will be expounded on in the below on our third aspect, contends that there is not, but also that
time is equally neither subjective. Bergson, whom we will now consider, has an even more creative
approach.
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7 That is, embedded and world-forming (inclusive of ideas such as those expressed by Husserl’s use of ‘horizon’; see Husserl,
op. cit., and David Woodruff Smith, Husserl, 2nd edn (Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2013).
8 Heidegger, op. cit., see pp. 332-333 (Section 68(c) in Heidegger’s original manuscript).
9 ibid., p. 334 (Section 68(d) in the original); emphases in the original.
10 ibid., p. 345 (Section 69(b) in the original).
11 ibid., p. 348 (Section 69(c) in the original); emphasis in the original.
12 ibid., p. 391 (Section 79 in the original); emphases in the original.
Bergson begins by differentiating number and the concept ‘number’ as an example of how we tend to
think in spatial terms (e.g. thinking about numbers by mentally placing quantities of objects side by side),
and then moves into a discourse wherein time is equated with space on the basis that time, in reflective
consciousness, is a medium that allows our discrete conscious moments (that is, with awareness) to be
viewed as a series, and therefore to be countable; coupled with the manner in which the concept ‘number’
involves a spreading out in space (counting), time can thereby be understood, Bergson argues, to actually be
space. He writes that:
we set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one
another, but alongside one another; in a word, we project time into space, we express duration in terms of
extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or chain, the parts of which touch without
penetrating one another.13
I think that even on these terms there is however room within this conception for a non-strict
equivalence, or at least arguably so. Bergson states that time is experienced by us in this way only because
we endure, but that if we were to withdraw the thinking ego there would be no succession but only the
moment and its X, and conversely if we take away the X there will not be anything but the ego ‘without
moments external to one another, without relation to number.’14 In each case the linear disappears, leaving
merely a now and an object in the first and a foundationless ego in the second; given what remains after
these moves can time really be said to ‘be’ space, or even to ‘be’ anything at all other than the method by
which we relate to and orient our lives? In the former and the latter it would seem that time simply
vanishes, even if space remains. For the first a ‘now’ might be left over, but what is that without a ‘back
then’ or an ‘after this’ to place against or compare with? Does time then actually exist in any form other than
the semi-arbitrary arrangements we have devised for measuring it? Put another way, does time have any
meaning for the self at its core level, or only for the whole (enworlded) person? The sun goes up and comes
down and we count that as a day, subdividing it into blocks of seconds, minutes, and hours based on units of
sixty － but sixty has been chosen for historical reasons (a legacy of the Sumerians and Babylonians15), and
empirically speaking the sun does not after all ‘go up’ nor does it ‘come down’, in fact it does not move at all
except in our abstracted figurations. The Earth circles and would still circle were we not here to count its
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13 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, 3rd edn, trans. by F. L. Pogson
(Mineola, NY: Dover, 2001 unabridged republication/London: George Allen and Co., Ltd., 1913), p. 101; note that Bergson’s use
of ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness’ is the traditional one that equates such with purposeful thinking or awareness; the topic is a
separate one from our primary concerns here but I elsewhere argue that consciousness ought to be considered as ongoing
throughout a life (even during deep sleep and similar states), and thus it grounds all mental functioning, including states of
active rationality. For this reason I prefer the terms ‘aware’ and ‘awareness’ to ‘conscious’ and ‘consciousness’ in order to
draw a line between what is sometimes there (awareness) and what is always there (consciousness), and I use ‘preconscious’
to further indicate the layer of automatic brain functioning that is mind-oriented but automatic, its data never entering purely
as they stand into active mental states yet nevertheless directly delivering behavioral and perceptual influences (e.g. intuitive
judgments, sensual input processing, etc.); see my Blurred: Selves Made & Selves Making (forthcoming).
14 ibid., p. 108.
15 Michael A. Lombardi, ‘Why is a minute divided into 60 seconds, an hour into 60 minutes, yet there are only 24 hours in a
day?’, Scientific American.
< https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/experts-time-division-days-hours-minutes/ >. Accessed 12 June 2018.
rotations; would time or ‘time’ then endure － in the concrete or in the conceptual － as anything
substantive without any creatures around who obsessively made notations about it?
This is not to discount the weight that our approaches to time take in our lives, and surely how we
consider it in the way we speak and think extends its influence far into the shaping of the self. Yet
definitionally, if time without the ego (‘ego’ in the psychological sense as per Bergson above) can be boiled
down to this X, as Bergson directs us to think, then need we even say that time ‘is’ space? Why not simply
put it as time is not, or time is only the perceived now? That would seem to at least attune time more
closely with the self and its involvements. The answers to these questions will depend on whether we are
taking ‘time’ in an ultimate sense or in its meaning of ‘duration’, and it is in that second shading where
Bergson considers time to really hold experiential relevance for us, and therefore we may find a deeper
pertinence to our purposes taken from that angle.
Bergson brings us back to the importance of our mental modes in the applicability of time, showing
that succession and duration only exist for us due to the ‘interpenetration of our conscious states’, and that
we must not be led astray by such linguistic devices as ‘between now and then’ to think that anything more
is going on than the mind noting a number of simultaneities. Intuitively and naturally (and, says Bergson,
‘probably what animals perceive’), time is experienced as a quality, and it only becomes an issue of quantity
when set in (that is, projected into) space.16
On this broader issue of quality and quantity, Bergson explains in a later work how the Ancients (in the
Western tradition) did not make the distinctions that we do today, and that for them the barriers between
those aspects, and between body and mind, were of a far different and far more permeable order.
Mathematical (number) concepts were like any other concept and fit into the overall hierarchies of Ideas,
while the body was not purely geometrical and the soul/mind not purely consciousness; instead the psyche
contained the same vital force of a living body and the body was less corporeal, itself too containing the
Idea.17 I should highlight that in relating this portion of Bergson’s analysis I do not mean to make a case for a
neo-Aristotelean nor a neo-Platonic view of the cosmos, rather I simply wish to point out that the way and
the level upon which we approach a topic has ramifications for our understanding that are far greater and
deeper than we may at first suspect. How we talk can mask layers and layers of background assumptions,
and in so doing predetermine our conclusions and blind us to options that would otherwise hold great
appeal.
Taken together the overall picture that emerges from a study of our first listed aspect is that in our
standard and everyday functioning the approach we have to time is to view it as an external element whose
forces act upon us and pressure our behaviors and decisions. Time is ‘out there’ and because it is I must X
very carefully in order to Y two hours from now so that Z will be at all possible, et cetera, et cetera. From a
practical point of view this is not strictly incorrect, and living in the societies and having the demands that
we do it even makes good pragmatic sense to comprehend time in this fashion. Yet to do so does
nevertheless shift one’s focus from a directing to a directed mode － or rather it maintains the default
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17 Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. by Arthur Mitchell (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1998 unabridged republication/New
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1911).
outlook of the directed －, the passivity of the receiver as against the activity of the giver. Accepting time in
this way keeps one stuck in the neglected self, in the ‘made’ self of the contextual (embedded) forces which
undoubtedly do constitute a part of who we are, but need not be the whole of the story. Far more
possibilities open for us to the degree that we strive instead to create our selves through a purposive and
intentional control of the direction of our becoming. The manner in which we perceive time is an important
element of this process.
If we continue to believe (or merely accept) that time is something extrinsic, that it is powerful and
objective, then we will persist in being subjected to it and our selves will have a greater amount of
receptivity and a lesser degree of responsiveness to whatever our goals for transformation or transition
might be (assuming that we have at least some goals). In short, we － our selves － will be buffeted by the
winds and waves of chance, by the circumstantial, the situational. What control might be available will not
be taken advantage of, and we will float steadily along to the end of a life marked by half-measures. For
obvious reasons this ‘made’ self, for all of its commonality in the hypermodern world wherein one scarcely
has a chance to catch one’s breath, is what the wise in our midst have consistently argued against. What has
conversely been argued for is the ‘making’ self, the directed and active － intentional － self, but to get
there, I think, we need to see time differently. This will be the second aspect of time and the self that we will
explore.
3. Stopwatches
To approach time in a purposive and aware manner, to take it as something internal rather than
external, runs counter to the standard understanding as described above, but it is an important first step (if
we are to take any steps) on the way to self-making. In this section too we will return to the same trio of
thinkers for a theoretical foothold to assist us in our launch － or lurch － into an alternative time, and then
in the section hereafter apply such thoughts to a creating self. To begin, Husserl, with his focus on memory,
astutely teaches that remembering is not apprehension, not perception, and that what is held in memory is
fundamentally different from what activated our senses;18 a condition which can perhaps be structurally
compared to an awareness and having an awareness of awareness. To garner such (the latter) implies a
certain degree of mindfulness, a step back from the rush of the everyday, a meta-point of view, and it is easy
to recognize how seldom this happens in life and how much effort it requires. Regarding the perception of
objects, Husserl stresses the impossibility of any external view ‘exhaust[ing] the sensuous-material content
of its perceived object’, or of presenting to the beholder/experiencer something ‘literally from all sides at
once in a self-contained perception’, instead we have access at any given moment only to an ‘appearance
core’ upon which we impose ‘a system of referential implications’.19
This whole process must be natural and it must be automatic, and this conclusion befits what research
in the cognitive sciences has revealed about the systems and layers upon which our mental mechanisms are
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18 Husserl, op. cit.; from On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, Section 12.
19 ibid., p. 221-222. This is taken from Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic,
Section 1.
run.20 It should also be kept in mind that in this analysis the word ‘perception’ does not merely indicate the
visual, and it may not indicate sight at all; rather it is an issue of comprehension, and with that all of the
attendant background prejudicial and assumption-based conceptual blinders and guides, fences and walls
from behind which we view our surroundings and that hinder each of us from ever truly participating in the
wholeness of the realities we encounter. Out of the midst of these factors one’ s horizon looms, one’ s
possibilities become defined (limited), and one’s world － in the Heideggerean sense － is created. Husserl
describes the situation thusly:
everything that genuinely appears is an appearing thing only by virtue of being intertwined and permeated with
an intentional empty horizon, that is, by virtue of being surrounded by a halo of emptiness with respect to
appearance. It is an emptiness that is not a nothingness, but an emptiness to be filled-out; it is a determinable
indeterminancy. For the intentional horizon cannot be filled out in just any manner; it is a horizon of consciousness
that itself has the fundamental trait of consciousness as the consciousness of something.21
Here we have a clear picture of what I propose to be occurring in the undertaking of a ‘making’ self, of
what is involved in an intentional and willfully built/created/formed/directed self. Time’s great slate －
approached as an ever-now － confronts the whole person seeking to make their self, but it must be
understood that such cannot occur out of a pure ‘nothing’, a void, and nor can any current trajectory be
entirely changed. Any individual’s phenomenological now has its (felt and understood) history, and the
scaffolding of self has already been laid down by those forces that we may label as historical chance
(including personal biological, cultural, familial, economic, et cetera, ingredients) or that we may determine
to be fate. However we choose to consider the epochal details we have inherited, they are there and it is out
of them that we are able to begin to dirty our hands on the potter’s wheel, giving shape to the self we would
become. This is an incremental discovering and constructing, and it can only be done if fully aware in the
now.
Heidegger too emphasizes the importance of the factors out of which we attempt to gain the
perspective on our selves and our existence that we need if we are to succeed in any ‘making’, writing that
‘If the thematization [i. e. projection of understanding, interpretation] of what is present…is to become
possible, Dasein must transcend the beings thematized’; yet if this thematization comes out of one’s concern
for one’s self, place, and activities in the world, then ‘a transcendence of Dasein must already underlie
“practical” being together with things at hand.’22 We are able to take this step back into a calculated
awareness because we are really already there, the complexities of the consciousness system (or network)
we have both enables and enacts it － we are not bound mentally and conceptually/perceptively to only the
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environmentally given as many nonhuman animals are. Time for us need not strictly be the ‘time’ indicated
by phrases like ‘space and time’ but can instead be the ‘time’ of absorption and targeted being. To engage
with time in this sense, I think, is to abandon the tyranny of chronos that is the hallmark of the default
position (characterized in the ‘made’ self) and instead to embrace time as definable and not as defining, as
the ‘what I do with it’ and not as the sweeping hands of the clock, as the internally existent and not as the
externally existent. It is from this type of point of view that one’s self can be purposefully formed. I would
not maintain that this attitude entails a denial of time in its socially shared or ‘public’ meaning (as per
Heidegger’s labeling of it), rather that it involves a personal commitment to undergoing the desired self-
transformation through an application of already existing abilities and a judicious use of available resources.
Bergson makes some similar points with regards to awareness and the comprehension of time in an
ultimate sense. In fact, he finds the idea of time notionally abstracted into a force of some manner to clearly
be a false one. It will be remembered that on Bergson’s analysis time, when thought of as a given and
undifferentiated whole, became equated with space, leading him to further conclude that if viewed as a pure
medium of some kind time as a concept is ‘spurious’ since it can be fully reduced to space and there cannot
be two forms of the same medium (time and space).23 Time as duration, however, is another matter.
Bergson writes that ‘Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when
our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states.’24 We can
agree with the latter whatever our thoughts on time per se as space might be (for, against, or neutral),
taking Bergson’s ‘pure duration’ as an awareness of the now as it happens, as a living in the ever-now that
(potentially) maintains an observation on one’s self as it develops in its becoming.
In Bergson’s later thought, and in regards to a scope of focus far beyond ours here but nevertheless
germane, he places becoming in a central role, interestingly reversing the classical view of Forms
degenerating into ‘matter’ and ‘becoming’ by arguing that if the Forms, as concepts, are seen to be
‘snapshots’ of an always changing reality then for us they are simply moments gathered. No longer
generative, they are instead ‘artificial reconstruction[s]’ and ‘symbolical expression[s]’.25 With becoming at
the core of a ceaseless transitioning we are able to understand duration as creation (i.e. as the constantly
being made/re-made), and Bergson extends his point with ‘if that which is being unmade endures, it can
only be because it is inseparably bound to what is making itself.’26 As for the universe, we might say, so for
the self. Bergson challenges us to see becoming, and not degeneration, as the driving force behind the
macrocosmos － again, maybe it is, maybe it is not, this is certainly not the place to enter that discussion －,
and if we can at least entertain the idea and so adopt (to some extent) its conceptual implications and
ramifications then we can shift our thinking regarding the microcosmos of the self to allow for its ‘making’
potential. In this we are thereby able to start to be as we would and not simply as we ‘are’, and we start too
to ‘take’ time and not simply to ‘watch’ it.
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4. Sundials
In our third and final aspect on time we will go deeper into the theoretical － filled out by the scientific －
and in doing so we will lean towards conclusions regarding the nonexistence of an external time that might
at first appear radical but whose groundwork has hopefully been set in the preceding. We will also consider
how phenomenologically our time, bound up with meaning as it is for us, appears to move not in a straight
line but in a series of sometimes expanding, sometimes shrinking spirals. The thoughts we will propose
here are not found in the works we have so far examined, but there are some hints at a more transcendental
view of time within them, and although we may wish to go our own way we can take something for the
journey from our selected forebears. Heidegger, as mentioned above, states that time is neither objectively
nor subjectively held, but is the possibility for both, or more precisely the possibility of the possibility of
both. He writes, ‘“Time” is present neither in the “subject” nor in the “object,” neither “inside” nor “outside,”
and it “is” “prior” to every subjectivity and objectivity, because it presents the condition of the very
possibility of this “prior.”’27 Being and Time’s closing question is also relevant here, and I feel too that it is
explanatory of Heidegger’s overall position: ‘Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of being?’28 This is
to ask whether or not being is bound by time, but I think rather it is the reverse; allow me to make this case
via one more look at some ideas of Bergson’ s, related notions from the field of physics, and my own
speculations in response.
In the context of arguing against the idea of a void or pure nothingness, Bergson situates time as a
concept squarely in the present, bringing our attention to the fact that for a creature without memory or an
ability to project a future (‘prevision’ in his wording), terms such as ‘void’ or ‘naught’ would not even be used,
only the perceived would be spoken of and that is necessarily a presence, not an absence. For us who have a
memory and who make use of a capability of thinking about the future, when we expect to find something
but do not we might linguistically employ ‘naught’ or ‘nothing’ or ‘void’ or the like, but when so, Bergson
insists, the instances are more akin to feelings than thoughts, with our speaking ‘tinged’ with the failure to
be realized. He goes on to argue that to think an object nonexistent is first to think it, and therefore to think
it existent, and then to add to that the idea of its exclusion. Bergson puts it this way, ‘The act by which we
declare an object unreal therefore posits the existence of the real in general.’29
What is the real in time? What is real about time? Is time real? Since we feel time in our lives and
observe our own growth and decay which seems so clearly linear, have we taken our idea of time and
pasted it onto a background wherein it is not to be found? That is, have we added, in the sense of the above,
time onto an in fact timeless ‘space-time’ merely due to our faculties of memory and projection? Time
and/or the idea of time certainly impacts our lives, and as we explored earlier a part of the default or
unreflective attitude towards time is to assign it a great importance. We have however sought to establish a
distinction between ‘time’ in a physical sciences sense and ‘time’ in a phenomenological sense, something
akin to what Bergson called ‘pure duration’ and of primary importance in our focus on the self. Let us
therefore now take a slight detour to consider the so-called hard sciences side to the concept (or intrinsic
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force?) of time in slightly more detail in the wish that by examining the assertions made about time’s
ultimate essence(s) we will the more readily be prepared for an analysis applicable to the ‘making’ self.
Approaching the issue from a philosophy of science perspective Herbert Dingle makes a similar cut to
the one by Bergson, differentiating between ‘time’ as an integral part of the universe (which he does appear
to accept as an existential component) and ‘the time’ as that notion which we measure by the use of clocks,
the latter of course being open to human interference (as happens every spring and autumn in many
countries when clocks are set ahead or back) while the former is well beyond reach.30 In this, moreover, a
clock is somewhat of a remarkable measuring instrument as its readings go on endlessly and
unidirectionally, regardless of any background changes in the overall empirical setting. Dingle moves his
discussion to claim that it is actually in this sense, this clock sense, only that Einstein’s famous relativity
theory should be understood, and hence that ‘the time’ is the singularly relevant (relative) issue, not ‘time’.31
This would mean that the only truly relative aspect to our universe would be our own human-centered and
human-limited use of ‘the time’ as a tool, and that ‘time’ would by contrast be rigidly uniform. If Dingle is
right and that is the case then Einstein has been so widely misunderstood, and his theoretical results so
misapplied, that the last half century’s efforts of conceptual analysis perhaps really ought to be forgotten.
What did Einstein find?
Hao Wang, a researcher who worked closely with Kurt Gödel and often discussed Gödel’s reactions to
Einstein’s ideas with him, summarizes the theory’s special framework as suggesting that:
each state of (uniform) motion determines a frame of reference and a temporal order. For two observers in
different states of motion, the temporal orders are different, so that, for instance, it is possible to see A happening
before B by one observer and B happening before A by the other.32
This by itself would imply that there is no real and existent ‘time’ to be found in the universe. However, in
its general framework Einstein’s relativity results also appeared to suggest that when matter was added to
the equations the claims of the observers were no longer equal, and that, Wang writes, ‘in all the solutions of
Einstein’s gravitational equations known before Gödel’s new ones’ it did seem reasonable by their lights to
assume a single true temporal order.33 Gödel, with his solutions, questioned this on mathematical and logical
premises, moving the argument back towards the view that Einstein’s special theory of relativity offered,
and in that adding his own idea of ‘rotating universes’.34 There is admittedly an impression here that the
mathematics involved might be obscuring the conceptual picture, especially when we consider the
extraordinary openness of mathematical possibilities at this level of theoretical complexity. I, for one, will
concede to being in far over my head. Thankfully, Wang does bring us back to more familiar experiential
grounds, reminding us that when thinking of time in a flowing manner we are confronted by the difficulty of
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having something that could ‘occupy different positions at different times’ but that, ‘I [we] experience a
succession of my [our] different states of mind, as though these states were flowing through my [one’s]
mind. This feeling seems to suggest the idea that time itself flows too.’35 Here again we have a feeling and
its suggestion and the resultant conviction, note however that such is not only related to an individual’s
consciousness it is entirely dependent on it, and that no claims are being made (nor could be made) in
relation to an outside and objectively existing time along such lines. We appear to still be where we started.
Wang next takes us in an intriguingly Bergsonean direction:
If we leave out my consciousness and that of other beings, then it is hard to see what is so special about Now, or
indeed to make sense of the very distinction between past, present and future. Without this distinction, however,
time would be like space in the sense that there is no flow and there is no distinguished direction or arrow of time…
Since physics, though it is developed by consciousness with the help of observations, aims at describing the world
of physical objects as they are in themselves, the concept of Now is not part of physics…If we require physical time
to have all the properties of intuitive time, it seems to follow that only the present world-state truly exists: but such
a conclusion appears not to conform to our intuitive concept of physical reality.36
This, indeed, is what I think the fact of the matter is, if anything about this topic can be said to be a ‘fact’
in the way in which that term is typically employed. There is no physics-based, no atomic or particle-
grounded ‘Now’ because there ‘is’ only a felt ‘ever-now’ for we minded creatures who have a high enough
degree of conscious functioning to be cognizant of our own continued existence: nothing is happening
outside of us, no force ‘time’ is acting upon us from the vast reaches of space － at the least not in a manner
or form we might be capable of comprehending, and in my view most probably not at all －, there is instead
only our awareness of a biological start and finish to which we affix organizationally useful labels such as
‘past’, ‘present’, ‘birth’, ‘death’, et cetera. The cosmos cares not for what we call ourselves nor it, existence
simply is, in some form or another － and we can stretch this all the way from the Big Bang to the Big
Crunch and back again, or alternatively focus only on our own planet or even our own neighborhood. On
this matter of ‘useful labels’ Wang also gives us the following recorded quotation from Gödel himself (dated
25 November 1975): ‘The real idea behind time is causation: the time structure of the world is just its causal
structure.’ Gödel goes on, in the full quote, to add that causation, mathematically speaking, is not in time but
is taken by us to be there.37
Against our position Gödel did nevertheless accept time as something real, as something external, but
not (apparently) as something objective. In this stance most contemporary scientists and philosophers
would agree with him,38 although beyond that point any widespread consensus appears to dissipate with
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some rapidity. Among the many interesting competing ideas regarding time two bear mentioning here
before moving on to expound further on our own conceptual take and therefrom its utilization vis-à-vis the
self. The first is the postulation that the asymmetry of events we mark in the world and which leads us to
deduce the common linear view of time is due not to any actual factors of time but rather to the physical
boundaries between material objects, lines that once crossed are either in (physical) fact or in practice
irreversible. (By ‘in practice irreversible’ it is meant that the requirements for a natural undoing are too
involved or too improbable to be taken into account under the terms by which we live.)39 If the seeming
asymmetry of our everyday surroundings is in this sense or a similar sense essentially illusory then the
position that an ultimate and externally existent time is but an illusion is one that I think can at least be
reasonably entertained, however far-fetched it might initially appear. Time might be nothing more than a
facet of how we happen to see the world given the many limitations we face as the manner of creatures we
are.
The other point to consider is related to the first, and demonstrates the common desire to retain a view
of time as something real, powerful, and intrinsic, even if not in the classical way that such elements have
heretofore been understood. Examples of this are Michael Dummett’s arguments for a ‘pointless geometry’
notion of time that tries to avoid the problem of indivisibility along a real line since no point can be halved: it
will either be on one side or the other of the severed location.40 Huw Price very similarly makes a case for
‘the view from nowhen’, by which he means taking time as real but as symmetrical through efforts to
overcome our natural tendency towards an asymmetric perspective by adopting an observational position
that is outside of time.41 Both of the preceding, and many other approaches seeking to retain a physico-
spatial grounding for an objective time, are interesting and intriguing ideas but it must be asked whether or
not too much heavy lifting is being required in these attempts; the most straightforward － and therefore
potentially the theoretically cleanest － solution might be that there simply is no ‘time’ at all, there is only
what Bergson called ‘pure duration’ and Dingle called ‘the time’, which is to say ‘our time’, the
phenomenological lived time of day-to-day experience.
This is not to say that the matter is settled, nor that our position of the absence of time in any ultimate
or real sense is the definitive or even the most indisputably robust one; it is rather only to start to make that
case, to give it a basis which is, I believe, defensible and reasonable, and having done so to now return to our
more focused and pragmatic concerns regarding the self, to applying these thoughts to what we have
termed the ‘making’ self, the purposive and intended self that can become an act of creation when through
awareness and will one takes such on. If the self is a project in this way then regardless of whatever time
may or may not be from an outlook that is kept strictly within the limits of the physical sciences, the
statement ‘I am my time’ is nevertheless one of some literalism, for the manner in which I choose to spend
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the time or the nows that I have (i.e. Heidegger’s ‘public’ time) is what fuels the ‘me’ in the undertaking. I am
my time － ‘I’ am my time － I ‘am’ my time － I am ‘my time’; however we emphasize it the end product is
the same: the way in which whole person ‘I’ arranges existence results in the formational and forming
elements of the core self, which in turn feed back into personal identity and other structural factors (goals,
worldviews, desires and dreams, details of embeddedness, et cetera) of the entire relational chain of the
whole person. My ‘I’ or ‘me’ is expressive of and founded upon the practice in which my personally known
time is allocated, pointing at the potential involved but also the discipline required for those who would live
actively enough to take charge of their self in the ‘making’ sense that we have indicated. Hence too a move
away from the default approach of how time is considered in the everyday ‘made’ self could be of great
advantage. Yet is such a move possible?
I believe it is, and I think our conclusion that there is no reality to time in an external, universal, and
ultimate sense assists in lending support to this view. If time, as we have argued, does not exist as anything
beyond an element of the human mind, or to all minds with higher levels of consciousness, then rather than
being a constitutional law of nature like gravity or the strong and weak nuclear forces it is instead
intrinsically connected with consciousness, perhaps merely a felt function of consciousness. We might ask
what, from a biological perspective, could be the purpose of such? The ready answer comes that first and
foremost it is a handy referent, extremely useful as a structural component for guiding a certain type of
organism’s life. If that is all that time really amounts to then a further inference might be a great reduction
in the difference between being alive and being dead. In the absence of an external and linearly flowing time
the eternal is ever and only, there is nothing but the pure now, in ‘life’ I perceive it and in ‘death’ I cease to,
yet fundamentally － cosmically － nothing has changed. If ‘now’ as felt and experienced by beings who can
feel and experience is the whole of time then that same sheer ‘now’ must contain infinity within its finitude,
all (felt) futures and pasts within its present, there is no room for any exclusion as there is nothing else and
hence this ‘I’ and its perceptions is equally as unlimited as it is limited. We are already dead every moment
we are alive and vice versa. If now is all there is to absolute time then Existence exists － period and full
stop, we simply are too restrictedly minded to recognize that.
On that last note of how we tend to be minded, we ought to consider too the implications of the
embedded situatedness (or ‘enworlded’ in the Husserlean ‘horizon’ and Heideggerean ‘world’ senses42) in
which we dwell, and the refrain born out of such concerns that the conceptual almost entirely determines
the perceptual, that there is no purely unbiased view from out of which one can escape an inevitable
perspectivism given the countless influencing factors bearing down on each of us all throughout one’s life.
Such seems particularly applicable when we take sociohistorical effects into account; picking up almost any
text reminds the reader of just how deeply we speak out of the milieu of the years we happen to live in, and
of how the reach of that which surrounds us and (especially in our current media-driven era) relentlessly
informs us plays into our interpretative stances.
Taking the informed decision to regard time differently than the purely chronos version is therefore
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not only an option but it is a legitimate option and not a case of self-deception, an outcome further
strengthened when we accentuate the experiential － as we are attempting to do here － for to me as an
individual in the world and in the midst of a constant barrage of stimuli and the resulting analyses,
judgments, choices, et cetera, there are really only two versions of the time I feel (and both are ‘my time’ not
an external time): Now and Fantasy. When I imagine the future or recall the past I am transmitting out of a
now, the only-now, and as Bergson highlights I do so in an imperfect way. Speculating on what may be and
remembering what (I think) was are games the mind plays in the moment. The ever-now is what is, it is
what is experienced, and it is the whole of the phenomenology of time for the kind of animals that we are,
even if it is not the whole of the conceptuality of time that we may or may not mentally hold. In this eternal
present the self takes shape, and if that self is to be a ‘making’ self instead of a ‘made’ self then administering
to the present and one’s own existence in it is a matter of tremendous apropos. When we are able to
extricate our awareness from the busyness of modernity and actually accomplish this, we facilitate and
empower our self-formation and turn our lives into directional works. It is in this way that ‘time’ fully
becomes a matter of being and not an erroneously assumed external juggernaut crushing all beneath as it
passes.
Finally, in staying a moment longer on the phenomenology of time as seen from an individual’s point of
view, what is it that we find when we do look to our own pasts? However deteriorated or vigorous our
memories may be, we discover primarily that particular events and ages (i.e. when I was X years old) stand
out far more clearly than do others, and they do so because of the meaning we have assigned to them. In a
discussion on Carl Jung’ s concept of synchronicity, which is often wrongly taken to mean a simple
simultaneity of events whereas by it Jung meant rather a strong psychological connection between events,
Stephan Hoeller writes that:
Time and space are relativized in certain experiences of the psyche, which implies that their subjective reality is
altered in accordance with meaning. The meaningful part of a synchronistic experience is never the mere
connection of events in objective astronomical time, but rather in the power of meaning residing in the subjective
image in the psyche, which relates itself dynamically to an outer event.43
Leaving aside Hoeller’s own (we may wish to say mistaken) presumption of an ‘objective astronomical time’,
in thinking on this I notice that in my own life these meanings have focused mainly on certain ideas, and
when I find myself coming back to them or being re-exposed to them (for whatever reason, or for no
ostensible reason at all), I discover a correlative strong sense of having looped back to that point when the
idea in question first made an impression on me. Only I have not ‘looped’ so much as ‘spiraled’, for in
returning to the beginning I take with me a new perspective won through the experiences had in between.
(I think that such might apply as well to instances of déjà vu.) These sensations of spiraling do contain the
familiar (illusory) aspects of a linear understanding of time since I am aware of being twenty-two and
coming across Y or the like, but the felt dimensions are of another order entirely, and in that feeling there is
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no trace of a ‘gap’ between now and then － it is a poignant perception of direct connection stemming from
the personal meaningfulness that has been assigned. In reflecting on the experience involved it strikes me
as credible to speculate that these meanings are more emotional and intuitional in nature than they are
rational. Thus we phenomenologically feel our ways through life in more or fewer spirals, and though our
bodies (including brains) age in their biological ways and rot away as they do, our minds enjoy a different
experiential trajectory.
5. Self/Time, Time-self
That last statement, and this position, is not meant in a dualist sense however, nor is it drawing any
dualist or even quasi-dualist conclusions; such would be ontic while the argument on the self contained
herein is a phenomenal one (albeit that our thoughts on time have been ontological). Regarding the self, and
especially in its ‘making’ variant, it might be helpful if we remember to break out of the mind/body reflex
that has culturally been bred into us － a legacy we have inherited － by again turning to Bergson. He
writes that experience tells us only that the mental and the physical are interdependent; from that an
equivalency of the two does not follow44 (and, I might add, we should also take care about any further
implications we may be tempted towards). We ought to recall as well just how historically placed our
notional lives are. In his discussion on the Forms referred to above, Bergson relates how for the classical
world mind/body dualism was a non-issue precisely because the Idea informed all, making the Ancients’
‘psyche’ less spiritual than our ‘mind’ and their ‘body’ less corporeal than ours. The ‘soul’ or ‘mind’ was not
defined by consciousness, nor the ‘body’ by extension: ‘The scission was not yet irremediable between the
two terms.’45 This is an example, I believe, of how the referential levels upon which we think dictate the
thought that results (the conceptual determines the perceptual) and therefore too how we speak, which
again colors and shapes how we think once more.
In our consideration of time, ranging from Husserl’s, Heidegger’s, and Bergson’s stances to Einstein,
Gödel, and contemporary physics, and in our position that time does not exist except as applied by us and
other creatures like us, I am not attempting to suggest that there are ‘dual times’ which operate
phenomenally; instead I am putting forward the case that time is experienced in conscious awareness on
these two planes: that of the presumed physical sciences linear form (an abstracted idea which becomes an
organizing tool) and that of the felt form (the nows which fill our days and from which we imagine personal
pasts and futures), of the illusion of an external absolute time and the reality of an internal durational one.
Mind is a part of body, it is a natural outgrowth of continued physical functioning just as a fingernail or a
strand of hair is: all types of experience are contained in the same single organism, and all nuances of time
are as well. The thinking mind-body in its operation considers time as spirals woven through with meaning,
and the automatic mind-body in its operation considers time as an arrow with the corollary effects of decay,
suffering, pain, and sometimes joy. The perception of time that we adopt and focus on, and the efforts we
make to break free of the mirage of an ‘objective time’, is a matter of purpose and of choice, of the
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theoretical lying behind the expressed, and of the endeavors engaged in at moving from the received ‘made’
self to the ‘making’ self. Time is the key, and with it the task of the self － the great life project of each
human being － is one that is and can only be taken in the ever-now, one that must be confirmed moment by
moment. ‘Time’ is not, ‘my time’ is; what to do with it?
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